Windows Event 4776 — NTLM Credential Validation

WindowsEvents Windows Security Pass-the-Hash / NTLM Abuse

What This Means

Analyze Windows Event 4776 to monitor NTLM authentication attempts. Detect pass-the-hash attacks, legacy protocol abuse, and credential validation failures across your domain.

Example Log

The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an account.

Authentication Package:  MICROSOFT_AUTHENTICATION_PACKAGE_V1_0
Logon Account:           admin
Source Workstation:      WORKSTATION07
Error Code:              0xC000006A
Status:                  0xC000006D

Indicators of Suspicious Activity

How to Investigate

  1. Identify the Source Workstation and verify it in your asset inventory
  2. Check the Error Code to understand the failure reason
  3. If Error Code is 0x0 (success) with NTLM, investigate why Kerberos was not used
  4. Correlate with Event 4624 on the target system to find the logon details
  5. Check if the Logon Account has been involved in other suspicious events
  6. Investigate whether the source workstation may be compromised

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Related Attack Patterns

Frequently Asked Questions

What does Event 4776 record?
Event 4776 is logged when the domain controller validates NTLM credentials. Unlike Kerberos events, it only shows the account name and source workstation — no IP address, making investigation harder.
Why is NTLM authentication a security risk?
NTLM is vulnerable to pass-the-hash attacks, relay attacks, and offline cracking. It does not support modern security features like mutual authentication. Organizations should minimize NTLM use and enforce Kerberos.
How do I reduce NTLM authentication in my domain?
Enable NTLM auditing first (GPO: Network Security: Restrict NTLM: Audit), review the logs to identify applications using NTLM, migrate them to Kerberos, then progressively restrict NTLM.